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MAKEUP OR FAKEUP?:  THE NEED TO 
REGULATE COUNTERFEIT COSMETICS 
THROUGH IMPROVED CHINESE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 
Jennifer Lei* 
 
This Note examines whether new developments in intellectual property 
enforcement are able to fix the notorious counterfeiting issue in China, 
particularly with counterfeit cosmetics.  Counterfeit cosmetics are a threat 
to public safety in the United States and globally, especially as the cosmetics 
industry continues to expand.  There are two opposing views on whether 
China’s intellectual property regime—in light of the 2017 to 2019 
developments—is able to address the issue.  This Note proposes that even 
with recent developments, current laws and enforcement methods do not 
reduce counterfeit production.  Instead, this Note argues that the Chinese 
government should use educational campaigns to improve citizens’ opinions 
of intellectual property rights, using the practice of the 2008 Olympics as a 
guide.  Stronger support leads to more effective enforcement methods. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One morning, Rachael McLaughlin rushed to the hospital with a swollen 
face, barely able to breathe.1  After the teenager received emergency 
treatment, her face remained swollen for days.2  Her lips were “completely 
gooey and blistering” after suffering from a life-threatening allergic 
reaction.3  The cause?  Counterfeit Kylie Cosmetics liquid lipstick.4 
Similarly, after Rosy Ferry used a limited-edition Dior eyeshadow palette 
purchased from eBay, she woke up the next morning with her eyes glued 
 
 1. Marci Robin, Woman Says a Counterfeit Kylie Cosmetics Lip Kit Caused This 
Horrifying Allergic Reaction, ALLURE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.allure.com/ 
story/counterfeit-kylie-cosmetics-lip-kit-allergic-reaction [https://perma.cc/9FML-CAYP]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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together.5  Only then did she realize it was counterfeit.6  Even after using 
antibacterial eye drops, Ferry continued to feel burning around her tear ducts 
for weeks, and the skin around her eyes remained red and flaky.7 
Unfortunately, these are not one-off occurrences.  Many consumers are 
deceived into purchasing seemingly authentic products that turn out to be 
counterfeit.  According to one survey, over a third of respondents realized 
their recently purchased cosmetics product was a counterfeit after 
experiencing an allergic reaction.8  Counterfeit cosmetics have become a 
popular alternative to their real, luxury counterparts.9  However, saving 
money can come at the cost of the consumer’s health.10  Counterfeit 
cosmetics commonly contain toxic components like mercury, lead, arsenic, 
cyanide, and even urine.11 
Public health scares like these highlight the need for strong intellectual 
property (IP) rights protection.  This protection is important for two reasons.  
First, protection and enforcement of IP rights12 fosters innovation; allowing 
individuals to hold sole ownership over a product or design incentivizes them 
to create a product or design for recognition and compensation.13  Second, 
proper protection and enforcement ensures that consumers are not deceived 
by IP infringers.14  People rely on a government’s ability to properly enforce 
these rights, and when the government is unable to do so, both companies 
and consumers are harmed.15 
 
 5. Claire Coleman, ‘Using Fake Make-Up Glued My Eyes Together’:  The Women Who 
Discovered the Dangers of Buying Counterfeit Beauty Products Online After Terrifying Scare 
with Knock-Off Designer Eye Shadows, DAILY MAIL (May 27, 2015, 8:11 PM), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-3099936/Using-fake-make-glued-eyes-women-
discovered-dangers-buying-counterfeit-beauty-products-online-terrifying-scare-knock-
designer-eye-shadows.html [https://perma.cc/8VR7-QM8Q]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Macaela Mackenzie, Makeup Dupes Are Unknowingly Being Bought by Customers, 
ALLURE (July 24, 2017), https://www.allure.com/story/how-to-avoid-buying-counterfeit-
beauty-products [https://perma.cc/Z6Q2-MXHM]. 
 9. See infra Part II.A (explaining consumer trends in authentic and counterfeit 
cosmetics). 
 10. See Bridget March, Fake Cosmetics Found to Contain Arsenic, Urine and Rat Poison, 
COSMOPOLITAN (May 18, 2015), https://www.cosmopolitan.com/uk/beauty-hair/news/ 
a35780/fake-cosmetics-arsenic-urine-rat-poison/ [https://perma.cc/GKU3-6CGK]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. In this Note, “protection” refers to the rights that are provided by statutes and 
“enforcement” refers to the tools and methods that governments use to uphold the rights 
provided by statutes. See Intellectual Property:  Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
NF32-XBNS] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 13. Why Is Intellectual Property Important?, STOPFAKES.GOV, https:// 
www.stopfakes.gov/article?id=Why-is-Intellectual-Property-Important [https://perma.cc/ 
HT9C-U7SL] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 14. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part II.B (explaining the health, social, and economic harms of counterfeits 
for companies and consumers). 
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China is infamous for its inability to protect and enforce IP rights.16  China 
has long been known as the “world’s factory” for creating counterfeit 
goods.17  But in recent years, as the country has seen tremendous economic 
growth, it has sought to improve protection and enforcement.18 
This Note argues that despite such efforts, China still falls short, which 
causes harm to many, including those in the cosmetics industry.  Because 
consumers continue to purchase counterfeit goods and China’s current efforts 
to curtail counterfeits cannot correct the issue,19 this Note proposes that the 
Chinese government work on changing the public’s perception of IP rights.  
Only then can new laws and increased penalties effectively address 
counterfeiting. 
Part I provides an overview of China’s modern IP law development.  First, 
it provides a background of the cultural influences on the nation’s perception 
of IP laws and the external pressures that influenced statutory revisions.  
Then, it describes IP enforcement methods and the most recent legal 
developments to address counterfeiting.  Part II examines current trends in 
the cosmetics industry, including the factors that led to its monumental 
success, and also discusses difficulties that the industry is facing, particularly 
with counterfeits. 
Part III outlines the two opposing standpoints on whether recent 
developments in China are enough to address counterfeiting.  Some claim 
that China is already strengthening its IP rights regime and that the 
developments will fix counterfeiting.  Others claim that the developments are 
merely punitive and deter neither infringers from producing nor consumers 
from purchasing counterfeits.  Part IV suggests that current enforcement 
methods are insufficient and proposes that the Chinese government focus on 
improving public support for IP rights to promote more efficient 
enforcement. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT AND LASTING EFFECTS OF CHINA’S WEAK IP 
REGIME 
When China rapidly industrialized, its innovative success required new IP 
laws.  However, despite its attempts to create strong IP protection and 
enforcement, China has struggled to curtail counterfeiting, which was 
fostered by industrialization.  The origins of Chinese IP law and its modern 
developments help explain why its current IP laws are weak.20  Part I.A 
 
 16. Wendy Wu et al., China Puts IP Rights in Sight as World’s Factory Evolves from 
Bootleg Hub to Top Patent Owner, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 10, 2018, 10:33 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/2141143/china-puts-ip-rights-sight-
worlds-factory-evolves-bootleg [https://perma.cc/A4QG-7ZS2]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 525, 528 (2012) (noting that China has had “many impressive economic and 
technological developments” and is “at the cusp of crossing over from a pirating nation to a 
country respectful of intellectual property rights”). 
 19. See infra Parts I.B, II.C (explaining the inefficiency of current enforcement methods). 
 20. See infra Part I.A. 
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explains the effects of Chinese culture and history on IP development in 
recent decades.  Part I.B explains current IP enforcement methods and notes 
methods commonly used by rights holders.  Part I.C describes the 2017 and 
2018 developments in China’s efforts to improve enforcement. 
A.  The History of Chinese IP Law Through Decades of Change 
Traditional Chinese culture cultivated anti-IP rights sentiments.  The 
modern definition of the Chinese term shan zhai refers to “counterfeiting that 
you should take pride in,”21  a phenomenon that benefits Chinese society by 
offering access to products at low prices.22  Traditional Chinese culture 
emphasizes informal social order and hierarchy and places societal interests 
over individual interests.23  This phenomenon, coupled with the Confucian 
principle that people cannot privately own spiritual property,24 created a 
nation with historically weak IP rights and enforcement.25  Weak IP 
protection and enforcement are engrained within Chinese culture itself. 
Beyond traditional Chinese culture, competing domestic and international 
interests changed IP laws in the last few decades.  China first recognized IP 
rights in the early twentieth century during a time when piracy became a 
serious concern.26  The nation adopted IP laws during the 1910s and 1920s, 
but these laws did not offer much protection and did not remain in effect for 
long.27  Following the 1949 creation of the communist People’s Republic of 
China, IP became a shared community right.28  During this first half of the 
twentieth century, China evidently had oscillating views of IP law. 
Following his rise in 1978, Deng Xiaoping reinforced IP rights as an 
individual right.29  This famous Chinese politician’s policies started the 
development of modern Chinese IP law. He implemented the “Four 
Modernizations,” a series of policies that reopened China to international 
trade and diplomatic relations with the West after a period of isolationism.30  
 
 21. Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes:  Intellectual 
Property Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 71 n.14 (2012) (quoting Nicholas 
Schmidle, Inside the Knock-Off Tennis-Shoe Factory, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine/22fake-t.html [https://perma.cc/2FBN-67VZ ]). 
 22. Edward Tse et al., Shan Zhai:  A Chinese Phenomenon, BOOZ & CO. 3 (2009), 
https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Shan_Zhai_AChinese_Phenomenon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77JV-Y63R ]. 
 23. Aileen M. McGill, Student Article, How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic 
Trademarks and Why This Success May Not Generate Immediate Improvements in Intellectual 
Property Protection in China, 9 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 7 (2010). 
 24. The Confucian concept of spiritual property is what the United States would call 
intellectual property. Edward J. Walneck, Note, The Patent Troll or Dragon?:  How Quantity 
Issues and Chinese Nationalism Explain Recent Trends in Chinese Patent Law, 31 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 450 (2014). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 71–72. 
 27. Id. at 72. 
 28. Justin McCabe, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights:  A Methodology for 
Understanding the Enforcement Problem in China, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 15 (2009). 
 29. See Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 72. 
 30. McGill, supra note 23, at 18 n.89. 
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The nation subsequently entered into a trade agreement with the United 
States, which required both countries to provide IP protections to citizens of 
the other country.31  Since the announcement of the Four Modernizations, 
China has actively amended its laws to meet the standards of international IP 
agreements.32 
In the 1980s and 1990s, China adopted its first modern IP laws in response 
to joining the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and ratifying 
the Paris Convention.33  These first laws offered very little protection34 but 
were adopted to solidify the nation’s position in the global market.35  During 
this period, many foreign companies shifted their production to China 
because of the country’s tax incentives, government subsidies, and low cost 
of labor.36 
During the 1990s, China prepared for accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) by enacting stricter IP regulations.37  Western nations 
repeatedly threatened China with economic sanctions and trade wars because 
of its weak IP regime.38  To address these concerns, China revised its IP laws 
and adopted various international treaties.39 
Scholars regard the 1980s and 1990s IP law revisions as ones motivated 
by external pressures.40  However, since joining the WTO in 2001, China has 
revised its laws in response to growing domestic needs.41  In joining the 
WTO, the nation became subject to the requirements laid out in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), which requires that the legal consequences of IP infringement 
“constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”42  TRIPS, however, does 
not outline the standard of legal consequences required to constitute a 
deterrent.43  Given the ambiguity in legal standards, China has ignored 
international pressure to strengthen enforcement.44 
 
 31. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 72. 
 32. See Kevin Eugene Thomas Cunningham Jr., Note, Fine China?:  A Look into Chinese 
Intellectual Property Infringement, Treaty Obligations, and International Responses, 99 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279, 289 (2017). 
 33. Brian J. Safran, A Critical Look at Western Perceptions of China’s Intellectual 
Property System, 3 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 135, 139–40 (2012). 
 34. See Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property 
System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2018). 
 35. Dina M. Bronshtein, Comment, Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals in China:  Could 
Changes Bring Stronger Protection for Intellectual Property Rights and Human Health?, 17 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 439, 446 (2008). 
 36. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 72. 
 37. Yu, supra note 34, at 1064. 
 38. Yu, supra note 18, at 529. 
 39. Id.; see also Bronshtein, supra note 35, at 446 (“China agreed to register all 
trademarks with the International Bureau of WIPO through its accession to the Madrid 
Trademark Agreement.”). 
 40. See McGill, supra note 23, at 9. 
 41. Yu, supra note 34, at 1082. 
 42. Bronshtein, supra note 35, at 446–47. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Jane Cai, Trade War:  Why US and China Remain so Far Apart on Intellectual 
Property Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 30, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/ 
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Instead, China is now responding to internal factors, like its growing 
economy.45  The nation intends to shift from a low-productivity 
manufacturing economy to one that is balanced with a “stronger service 
sector and a focus on scientific innovation”.46  To achieve this shift, it aims 
to improve its IP system to protect new innovations and businesses.  
However, the current laws and enforcement methods hinder this aim.47  The 
government continues to offer more rights protection and implement policies 
to achieve their aim.48 
The Chinese government gradually granted more protection to rights 
holders by enacting several amendments to the laws of trademarks, 
copyrights, and patents.  For example, these new laws established offices to 
separately oversee enforcement:  China National Intellectual Property 
Administration (CNIPA), formerly the State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO), oversees patent applications and enforcement;49 the National 
Copyright Administration, along with the administrative departments of local 
governments, oversees the protection of copyright;50 and the State 
Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), formerly the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), handles trademark 
registrations and enforcement.51  The establishment of the three major IP 
offices marked a dramatic change in Chinese IP laws compared to past 
decades. 
Trademark laws typically protect against counterfeits by protecting a 
brand’s image and help consumers distinguish between logos.52  Trademark 
 
news/china/diplomacy/article/2166315/trade-war-why-us-and-china-remain-so-far-apart-
intellectual [https://perma.cc/ZH6P-GHZM] (“China will continue to improve [IP rights] 
protection . . . to serve its own interests rather than bowing to US pressure.”). 
 45. Gillian Kassner, China’s IP Reform:  State Interests Align with Intellectual Property 
Protection (Again), JOLT DIG. (Apr. 24, 2012), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/chinas-ip-
reform-state-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again 
[https://perma.cc/MSW4-5CDR]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.; see also McCabe, supra note 28, at 6 (“[A]s a country becomes more powerful 
economically, thus becoming an exporter of intellectual property, the country has greater 
reason to empower its intellectual property system to protect these rights.”). 
 48. See infra Part I.C.   
 49. See Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality:  Running the Numbers and Possible 
Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 477, 487 (2012).  This Note refers to the 
office as “SIPO” to discuss actions and regulations prior to the restructuring and refers to the 
office as “CNIPA” to discuss post-restructuring actions and regulations. 
 50. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 106. 
 51.  Katherine Wang et al., China’s New State Administration for Market Regulation:  
What to Know and What to Expect, ROPES & GRAY (Apr. 3 2018), https://www.ropesgray.com 
/en/newsroom/alerts/2018/04/Chinas-New-State-Market-Regulatory-Administration-What-
to-Know-and-What-to-Expect [https://perma.cc/9DPE-QSUT] (“SAMR . . . will merge and 
undertake the responsibilities previously held by the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC).”).  For an explanation of SAIC’s former responsibilities, see Campbell & 
Pecht, supra note 21, at 82. 
 52. This Note will focus mostly on trademark law because it is the main law that protects 
against counterfeits.  However, counterfeits can also infringe on copyright and patent laws.  
For example, a cosmetic company’s concealer can have a patented formula and use several 
photographs for advertising.  A counterfeit of this concealer could infringe on patent rights for 
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law prevents brands from using similar branding and enables consumers to 
identify a product’s source.53  The first modern Chinese trademark law was 
adopted in 1982 and has been amended several times—with the most recent 
amendment in 2019.54  Despite the three amendments, Chinese trademark 
law creates challenges like “trademark squatting” and abuse of “well-known 
trademark” status. 
The trademark law uses a first-to-file system,55 which creates the issue of 
rights-squatting.  The first-to-file system grants a trademark to whomever 
files their application first, even if the applicant is not using the trademark 
for commercial purposes.56  Trademark squatting occurs when an applicant 
obtains a trademark to a brand they do not own.57  These squatters can use 
this right to obtain money from the actual brand owner or use the right to 
produce counterfeits.58 
Another notable feature of the law is the “well-known trademarks” status, 
which prevents an applicant from registering a trademark that is a 
reproduction, imitation, or translation of another person or company’s 
trademark.59  The well-known trademark does not have to be registered in 
China so long as the office deems that an applicant’s similar trademark may 
cause public confusion.60 
The Trademark Office and Trademark Review and Adjudication Board 
consider how familiar the public is with the trademark in question to 
determine whether a brand qualifies for well-known status.61  Other 
 
the use of this formula.  If the counterfeiter uses the company’s photographs for advertising, 
she will be infringing on copyrights. See Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 63, 75 (1999) (discussing Chinese copyright and patent laws); Christopher P. 
Foley, Protecting Chinese Company Trademark Rights in the U.S., FINNEGAN (May 2010), 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/protecting-chinese-company-trademark-rights-in-the-
u-s.html [https://perma.cc/587V-RGXM]. 
 53. See Foley, supra note 52. 
 54. See Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 75. 
 55. Shangbiao Fa (商标法) [2019 Trademark Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 23, 2019, effective Nov. 1, 2019), art. 31 (Westlaw China); see 
also Sunny Chang, Note, Combating Trademark Squatting in China:  New Developments in 
Chinese Trademark Law and Suggestions for the Future, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 337, 345 
(2014).  The United States does not have a first-to-file system and instead requires proof of 
commercial use, among other criteria, before someone can obtain a trademark. Chang, supra, 
at 345. 
 56. See Jessica Martin, Note, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:  A Need for China to 
Further Amend Its 2013 Trademark Law in Order to Prevent Trademark Squatting, 42 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 993, 1000 (2017). 
 57. See Chang, supra note 55, at 345–46. 
 58. Martin, supra note 56, at 1003.  But see Scott J. Palmer, China’s National Legislature 
Advances Changes to Trademark Law, PERKINS COIE (Apr. 30, 2019), https:// 
www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/chinas-national-legislature-advances-changes-to-
trademark-law.html [https://perma.cc/CNP5-F96V] (explaining that the most recent 
amendments to Articles 4, 33, and 44 of the Trademark Law may address the trademark-
squatting issue by providing “a solid legal basis for rejecting trademarks filed in bad faith and 
challenging them in the opposition and invalidation contexts as well”). 
 59. 2019 Trademark Law, arts. 9, 13. 
 60. Id. art. 13. 
 61. See id. art. 14. 
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considerations include how long the trademark has been in continuous use, 
the duration and extent of advertising, and the history of protection as a 
famous mark.62  Given the subjective nature of these factors, trademarks that 
may be popular in other countries may still fail to obtain well-known status 
in China.63 
Thus, even though the modern trademark law offers more protection than 
previous versions, there are still areas that leave rights holders or companies 
vulnerable.  The modern IP laws were developed through several decades of 
immense change but contain areas that can be strengthened. 
B.  Current IP Enforcement Methods and Their Criticisms 
As China continues to expand its IP regime, it must concurrently 
strengthen its enforcement methods.64  China’s IP system has increased in 
activity over the past few decades.  In 2016, China received over 1.3 million 
patent applications and saw a 21.5 percent growth in applications from the 
previous year;65 in 2017, about 43 percent of the world’s patent applications 
were filed in China.66  Today, the biggest challenge that the country faces is 
not in protecting rights but rather in enforcing them.67 
China is criticized for its failure to enforce IP rights because its current 
enforcement methods are considered flawed.  The national government seeks 
to improve these methods to keep up with the nation’s growing economy.  
Part I.B.1 discusses administrative raids, a popular method among foreign 
companies.  Part I.B.2 examines companies’ options for pursuing civil 
litigation against infringers.  Part I.B.3 explores criminal prosecution of 
infringers. 
1.  Raids by Administrative Agencies 
Administrative agency raids of warehouses are the most frequently used 
enforcement method in China.68  SAMR (formerly SAIC) is in charge of 
market supervision and regulation—a mission fulfilled in part by combatting 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 21, at 81 (using Bloomberg and Ferrari as examples of 
companies that failed to obtain “well-known” status for their trademarks).  Only a handful of 
foreign companies have obtained this status, including Disney, Walmart, Pioneer, and Barbie. 
Breann M. Hill, Comment, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in China:  Is There 
a Lasting Solution?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 281, 291 (2009). 
 64. Yu, supra note 18, at 544. 
 65. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., China Tops Patent, Trademark, Design 
Filings in 2016 (Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2017/ 
article_0013.html [https://perma.cc/7FVD-UWWC]. 
 66. Facts and Figures 2017, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
infogdocs/en/ipfactsandfigures2017/ [https://perma.cc/Q2DM-NPA2] (last visited Aug. 22, 
2019). 
 67. Yu, supra note 18, at 529–30. 
 68. Bob Youill, Effective Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement in China:  Stage by Stage, FTI 
CONSULTING 7 (May 2014), https://www.fticonsulting-asia.com/~/media/Files/us-files/ 
insights/reports/effective-anti-counterfeiting-enforcement-china.pdf [https://perma.cc/59Y7-
ZS35]. 
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counterfeits.69  One way agencies carry out this function is to work with local 
law enforcement to raid stores, factories, and warehouses containing 
counterfeit products.70  Prior to its merger with SAMR, SAIC acted on behalf 
of trademark rights holders to perform raids when the rights holder submitted 
a petition.71  Upon conducting the raid, SAIC had the authority to decide 
whether rights were infringed and, if so, could choose to destroy the goods, 
confiscate the goods, or impose fines on the infringers.72 
Raids are conducted by all three of the IP agencies.  While SAMR oversees 
trademark raids, CNIPA (formerly called SIPO)73 oversees raids for patents 
and can order infringers to stop production.74  The National Copyright 
Administration oversees copyright infringement and can order infringers to 
stop production.75  It can also confiscate or destroy the infringing products.76  
Because these agencies have the discretion to decide whether to act on a 
petition, it is possible that, upon investigation, they may determine that there 
is no infringement or that they do not need to take further action.77 
Foreign companies prefer to enforce their rights through raids because of 
the publicity and the quick and inexpensive results.78  The outcomes from 
these raids often make headlines because of the sheer number and value of 
products seized each time.79  For example, in February 2017, SAIC seized 
about $120 million worth of counterfeit cosmetics that infringed the rights of 
Chanel, Christian Dior, L’Oréal, and Estée Lauder.80  Not only is each raid 
abundant in the quantity and value of products seized but the government 
also publishes raid statistics.81  The headlines lead the public (and 
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companies) to believe that raids are effective.82  Raids provide a quick 
solution:  they recover large amounts of counterfeit products each time, 
making them an appealing option for companies.83 
Further, raids are inexpensive and fast compared to litigation.84  Yet, they 
are only a short-term solution.85  Despite their popularity, raids have barely 
impacted the counterfeits market.86  After a raid, infringers return to 
counterfeiting as soon as the next day.87  Counterfeiting has not decreased88 
because infringers actively produce more than what is being seized.89 
Raids also place local governments in a difficult position.  Counterfeiting 
activity stimulates small, local economies, which provides a major reason for 
local protectionism.  Local government officials choose to prioritize local 
interests over the interests of outside parties,90 which affects the efficiency 
of both raids and litigation91—the two direct enforcement methods that 
companies can pursue.  Counterfeits are often produced or stored outside of 
big cities or coastal areas where the national government’s ability to oversee 
IP rights is relatively weak.92  The practice makes up a large, if not a majority, 
of the local economy in rural areas.93  The activity provides work to locals 
and revenue for legitimate businesses, such as restaurants, hotels, nightclubs, 
transportation companies, and storage facilities.94  Further, those involved in 
the counterfeiting business pay substantial local taxes, which are used to 
provide essential public services.95 
Local officials, who are incentivized to strengthen their local economies, 
face a conflict of interest when they are instructed by national agencies to 
raid these production sites.96  Some local government officials even accept 
bribes, lie about conducting the raids, or invest money into the counterfeiting 
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activities themselves.97  Thus, raids are often merely an illusion that the 
government is eliminating counterfeits.98 
2.  Civil Litigation Against Counterfeiters 
Litigation is the other direct enforcement method that companies can 
pursue.99  IP litigation in China has increased drastically.100  In 2015, courts 
accepted approximately 109,000 IP rights civil cases of first instance,101 
whereas in 2004, the courts accepted approximately 9000 cases of first 
instance.102  Strong IP enforcement is developing in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and other major cities and coastal regions,103 which benefit 
rights holders who pursue litigation.  On the other hand, counterfeiting and 
piracy are moving to the less developed parts of China, where judicial 
authority is weaker.104 
Local protectionism also affects litigation outcomes.  Local tribunals or 
local courts typically try IP litigation matters and, like the local 
administrators who underreport raids, local judges are incentivized to protect 
counterfeiting defendants.105  Local protectionism creates a bias against 
foreign rights holders in favor of domestic companies; in one analysis, the 
litigation “win rate” for domestic companies against foreign companies is 
about 60 percent.106 
Further, foreign companies generally do not rely on litigation to enforce 
their rights due to its lengthy process.107  In 2013, cases brought by foreign 
companies made up 1.9 percent of all IP litigation cases in China and in 2015, 
these cases accounted for 1.2 percent.108  The hesitation exists for several 
reasons:  (1) rights holders often find it difficult to obtain immediate relief 
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from civil courts;109 (2) courts rarely issue preliminary injunctions;110 and 
(3) some courts will not try the case while it is still being investigated by an 
agency.111  Rights holders must wait until the agency concludes the 
investigation, which typically takes a few months.112  The delayed litigation 
hurts plaintiffs because the longer the courts take, the easier it is for 
counterfeiters to move and take any evidence with them.113 
The final criticism of litigation is that damages are generally low.  
Litigation is more expensive than raids.114  Yet, despite the costs, the difficult 
process can yield minimal results.  Chinese IP laws award damages below 
the real economic harm done by the counterfeits and these awards do not 
include punitive damages that can deter future counterfeiting.115  For 
example, prior to the 2019 amendment, the court could only award damages 
up to 3 million yuan renminbi (RMB)116 (or about $435,000) when the court 
had trouble determining actual loss suffered by the rights holder or the profit 
gained by the infringer.117  This damage cap may be common considering 
that evidence of infringement is hard to obtain.118  Courts have the discretion 
to award up to this cap, and a court that protects local interests may 
consistently award low damages.119  Thus, local protectionism and statutory 
limitations make litigation an unattractive option for companies. 
3.  Criminal Prosecution 
The final enforcement method is criminal prosecution.  IP infringement is 
prohibited under Chinese criminal law,120 but a convoluted adjudication 
process hinders proper prosecution.121  To go after infringers, companies 
must first either directly bring their case to the Public Security Bureau or 
report to an IP agency like SAMR, which will then transfer the case to the 
Public Security Bureau.122  If there is sufficient evidence and the 
infringement is serious enough, the bureau will then transfer the case to a 
prosecutor.123 
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Like civil litigation, criminal prosecution in China is also rare.124  The 
government will often overlook small- and medium-scale operations, as these 
infringers are not considered “serious.”125  Instead, criminal prosecution is 
reserved for large-scale operations that infringe on the rights of the biggest 
brands.126  Raids tripled between 1999 to 2008 and the average fine increased 
from about $750 to about $1200.127  Similarly, the number of cases 
transferred to the judiciary for criminal prosecutions have also increased 
during this time period,128 though only from 0.12 percent of all cases to about 
0.24 percent.129  Additionally, not all of these cases result in a verdict 
favoring the rights holders.130  Thus, although there are three methods of 
enforcing IP rights, these methods all have faults that impede effective 
enforcement. 
C.  China Implements New Policies with the Hope of Improving IP 
Enforcement 
China is increasing its enforcement efficiency in response to international 
criticism.  Between 2017 and 2019, China enacted three major changes 
affecting IP rights to address the current issues surrounding enforcement.131  
This section will discuss the three major changes and the improvements the 
government is seeking.  Part I.C.1 covers new tribunals that specialize in IP 
cases and are aimed at expanding enforcement outside of big cities and 
coastal areas.  Part I.C.2 describes the reorganization of SIPO, which gives 
this previously patent-exclusive office more authority to centralize 
enforcement methods.  Part I.C.3 discusses a new law that will hold e-
commerce platforms liable for allowing third-party sellers to sell 
counterfeits. 
1.  IP Tribunal Courts in Smaller Cities 
In 2017, the central government established IP tribunals in Suzhou, 
Chengdu, Nanjing, and Wuhan and allowed them to take on IP cases.132  This 
system takes authority away from local courts that previously heard IP cases 
and were prone to protecting local interests.133 
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With new courts in place, China also added new policies that enable these 
courts to award higher damages.  In 2015, the Supreme People’s Court 
promulgated an interpretation of Chinese civil procedure law that established 
a more formal discovery process aimed at increasing the requests for the 
production of evidence.134  The discovery process could produce accounts, 
records, and books that detail counterfeit production and profits, which helps 
judges determine more accurate damage amounts.135  The discovery process 
helps companies obtain evidence against counterfeiters who could previously 
take advantage of the long litigation process by erasing evidence.136  Judges 
can award higher damages given the accessible evidence and formal 
discovery process. 
The 2019 amendment to the Trademark Law further bolsters the strength 
of these courts by increasing statutory and punitive damages.  The 2019 
amendment increased statutory damages from 3 million RMB137 in 2013 to 
5 million RMB (approximately $743,000).138  Punitive damages were 
increased from three times139 to five times of either the profits of the 
infringer, losses suffered by the rights owner, or a reasonable licensing 
royalty.140 
2.  Restructuring the IP Office to Consolidate Authority 
In 2018, China’s national government announced a restructuring of its 
patent office, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO).  Previously, the 
Trademark Office, a branch of the now-dismantled SAIC (which conducted 
raids), oversaw trademarks, while SIPO exclusively oversaw patents.141  In 
March 2018, the government granted SIPO the responsibility of overseeing 
trademarks and patents,142 while also renaming the office to China National 
Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA).143  CNIPA has the power to 
manage and grant patent and trademark applications and adjudicate 
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disputes.144  The government also created SAMR to oversee CNIPA and help 
enforce patents and trademarks.145  Copyright remains under the authority of 
a separate administration, the National Copyright Administration.146 
The Chinese government centralized CNIPA’s authority to overcome 
jurisdictional conflicts between the previous trademark and patent agencies, 
as both administrations could previously investigate infringement actions and 
command their own enforcement teams (for raids).147  However, these 
separate teams worked under different laws and regulations, which led to 
inconsistent results, especially when the product infringed on both patents 
and trademarks.148  The two administrations had different remedies as well; 
SAIC could confiscate and destroy counterfeit goods, while SIPO could only 
order the counterfeiter to stop production.149  The national government 
restructured the IP offices to streamline enforcement methods, particularly 
raids. 
3.  E-Commerce Platforms Must Prevent Counterfeits in Marketplaces 
The Chinese government passed a law in August 2018—enacted in 
January 2019—that held e-commerce platforms responsible for the sale of 
counterfeit goods on their sites.150  Per the law, major Chinese e-commerce 
platforms like Taobao and Pinduoduo have to audit sellers’ business 
qualifications and establish a channel for consumers to report counterfeit 
products.151  When these e-commerce platforms receive a report, they must 
handle the matter in a timely manner.152  With e-commerce on the rise,153 
this new law aims to make it more difficult for counterfeiters to avoid 
detection and punishment by using internet anonymity.154 
Thus, in the past few decades, China has undergone major changes to its 
IP regime, but it is still criticized for its ineffective enforcement methods.  
China seeks to rectify this ineffectiveness through the recent IP 
developments, but the efficacy of these developments is yet to be determined. 
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II.  COSMETICS AND COUNTERFEITS 
As long as enforcement methods are inefficient, counterfeiters will 
infringe on the products of prominent industries.  As an industry experiencing 
huge growth, the cosmetics industry is a prime target for counterfeiters.155  A 
major source of the industry’s success stems from online sales and heavy 
internet advertising.156  Part II.A explains that while the internet is the source 
of industry success, it is also a source of revenue loss due to the accessibility 
of counterfeits.  Part II.B highlights the harm of counterfeits to consumers 
and companies.  Part II.C discusses how consumers, companies, and e-
commerce platforms are protecting themselves against counterfeits. 
A.  The Success of the Cosmetics Industry 
The global cosmetics157 industry is a billion-dollar industry that continues 
to grow immensely.  In 2017, the global cosmetics products market was 
valued at approximately $532 billion—and it is expected to be valued at 
approximately $805 billion within the next five years.158  A major source of 
the industry’s success is the internet, but the platform does not come without 
its drawbacks. 
Online marketing and e-commerce are major sources of revenue for 
cosmetics companies.  Between 2011 and 2016, e-commerce cosmetics sales 
increased at a quicker rate than sales through drugstores, department stores, 
and mass merchandisers.159  Last year, cosmetics e-commerce increased by 
$1.6 billion while brick-and-mortar sales decreased by $168 million.160  
Amazon became the largest online beauty retailer in the United States, 
accounting for 36 percent of online cosmetic sales.161  Social media sites like 
Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat help companies advertise directly to 
consumers.162  Although these social media outlets are a great medium for 
advertising, one of the most important outlets is YouTube.  In June 2016, 
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beauty-related content, mostly created by influencers,163 generated more than 
5 billion views per month on YouTube.164  These beauty influencers were 
also responsible for about 97 percent of cosmetics-related conversations on 
social media.165 
Major cosmetics companies use technology and social media for their 
benefit, yet technology has also become a double-edged sword.  The 
counterfeiting issue is perpetuated by the rise of technology.166  The same 
company-sponsored influencers also promote counterfeit cosmetics to their 
millions of followers.167  While the internet provides a bigger platform for 
cosmetics companies to sell their products, it also provides customers the 
opportunity to purchase counterfeits, whether knowingly or unknowingly.168  
Despite the strong industry growth, cosmetic companies are dealing with a 
rise in counterfeit products.169 
B.  With a Successful Industry Come the Counterfeits 
Counterfeits170 look like exact copies of brand-name items and are 
intended to fool consumers into believing that the product was made by the 
brand itself.171  By marketing fake products as genuine ones, counterfeits 
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infringe on trademarks—but they may also infringe on patents and 
copyrights.172  While some market research suggests that counterfeits can 
increase brand awareness,173 generally, counterfeits are harmful to both the 
companies and consumers. 
Counterfeits cause economic and reputational harm.  Counterfeits hurt a 
company’s reputation, the very thing that a trademark seeks to protect.174  
Because counterfeits are meant to deceive consumers, those who try these 
knockoffs thinking they are the authentic product may form a poor opinion 
of the authentic product.175  These fake products are associated with 
economic loss, loss of public funding, health risks, and criminal activity.176  
According to the International Chamber of Commerce, companies lose 
approximately $12 billion in revenue every year as a result of counterfeits 
despite increased efforts to combat the issue.177  Counterfeits are mostly 
produced in China, yet they cause economic harm to other nations.  In 2013, 
63 percent of seized counterfeit items originated in China and 21 percent 
originated in Hong Kong.178  This same report lists countries that are “hit 
hardest”179 by trade in fake goods— and the United States makes the top of 
the list.180  U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized nearly $1.4 billion 
worth of counterfeit goods in 2016.181 
To keep the cost of production low, counterfeiters will replace high-quality 
ingredients found in authentic products with dangerous filler chemicals, 
which creates health risks for consumers.182  Common dangerous “filler” 
components include mercury, lead, arsenic, cyanide, and feces.183  Exposure 
to these materials can have long-term toxic effects on bodily systems—
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including the nervous, digestive, and immune systems—and can also damage 
lungs, kidneys, skin, and eyes.184 
These health concerns are further exacerbated by the amount of counterfeit 
cosmetics in the market.  As of 2015, 20 percent of the Chinese cosmetics 
market was counterfeit.185  Even though a majority of the counterfeits are 
made in China, they still make their way to other countries.  E-commerce 
sites like Amazon, eBay, Newegg, and Walmart promote the proliferation of 
counterfeits online and make it difficult to enforce anticounterfeiting 
measures.186  With Amazon accounting for over a third of online cosmetics 
sales in the United States,187 counterfeits on that platform pose a high risk to 
consumer health.  Customs agents reported that fake personal care items are 
now even more common than knockoff handbags.188 
Global seizures exemplify the gravity of the counterfeit cosmetics issue.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reported that 
the value of counterfeit perfumes and cosmetics in 2013 was estimated at 
$3.8 billion189 and that global seizures increased by 25 percent from 2011 to 
2013.190  After confiscating a shipment of 90,000 counterfeit cosmetic 
products, a Chinese customs official stated, “[i]f such a large number of 
counterfeit cosmetics—possibly containing toxic chemicals—were to leave 
[China], it could have negatively affected the health of tens of thousands of 
people.”191  Estée Lauder reported that it “conducted over 1350 seizures and 
confiscated over 2.6 million pieces of counterfeit products” in 2016.192  
Stronger regulations are necessary given the dangers of counterfeit cosmetics 
and the vast quantity of counterfeits available today. 
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C.  Consumers and Companies Bear the Burden of Preventing Counterfeits 
Consumers and companies have taken on the responsibility of protecting 
themselves against counterfeits due to China’s ineffective enforcement 
methods.  Consumers must learn to spot counterfeits when they purchase 
products online, or they must learn to buy from reliable sources.193  
Consumers also blame companies for counterfeits and they believe that 
companies have a responsibility to keep these products off the market.194  
They pressure cosmetics companies and e-commerce platforms195 to 
implement their own policies to tackle counterfeit products. 
Major cosmetics companies like Estée Lauder and L’Oréal are taking steps 
to prevent the counterfeiting of their brand-name products.  Estée Lauder has 
an investigative team of about twenty-four people all around the world, 
including in China and Hong Kong.196  This team works closely with 
government agencies in conducting raids and seizures, monitoring social 
media, and educating customs officials.197  Similarly, L’Oréal works with 
government authorities to conduct investigations and often reports the 
counterfeiters to law enforcement agencies or pursues civil action.198  
L’Oréal also uses “a proprietary coding system” that gives a “license plate” 
to a portion of its products to help it determine which products are stolen, 
diverted, or counterfeited.199 
The actions of these two companies are common for major luxury brands.  
Like Estée Lauder and L’Oréal, many multinational companies have 
established their own brand-protection units that work with government 
officials, in this case SAIC, to conduct raids and seize counterfeits.200  
Sometimes, the units also work with private investigation companies to 
locate counterfeiters.201  The brand-protection units in China are assigned to 
manage the advertising, marketing, and sales of their company’s products 
and they evaluate products based on total sales revenue and market 
penetration.202 
In China, e-commerce platforms struggle to regulate counterfeits in their 
marketplaces, which host third-party sellers on their platforms.  JD.com, a 
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Chinese e-commerce platform, generates half of its revenue from its own 
warehouse and has about 60,000 merchants in its separate market 
platform.203  The company claims that limiting the number of third-party 
sellers and maintaining merchandise in its own warehouse help it regulate 
counterfeits.204  In contrast, its e-commerce competitor Taobao, owned by 
the Chinese company Alibaba, has over 8 million third-party sellers and 
spends over $16 million a year to combat counterfeits.205  Despite these 
different business models, approximately 90 percent of the products on both 
of these platforms’ marketplaces were fake, according to SAIC.206  One 
Beijing-based online cosmetics store, Jumei International, abandoned its 
independent marketplace feature altogether because it could not properly 
combat counterfeits.207 
E-commerce companies like Alibaba and JD.com are taking steps to 
combat counterfeits.  The high amount of counterfeits found on Taobao 
raised concerns about Alibaba’s e-commerce legitimacy.208  The Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, a U.S. trade watchdog, placed Alibaba on its 
“notorious markets” list due to these concerns.209  To improve its reputation, 
Alibaba implemented a program that allows brands and retailers to report 
counterfeits and demand takedowns.210  Since this implementation, Alibaba 
has responded to takedown demands within twenty-four hours,211 which has 
led to a 42 percent decrease in the number of takedown requests and a 17 
percent increase in enrollment for this protection program.212  Alibaba 
reports that this program has been largely successful, given these promising 
statistics.213 
In sum, the cosmetics industry has recently grown at a tremendous rate and 
this success can be attributed to the industry’s strong use of the internet for 
e-commerce and advertising.  However, the internet also promotes 
counterfeit cosmetics, which raises health risks.  As a result of China’s 
 
 203. See Cendrowski, supra note 185. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Yue Wang & Carla Thomas, Alibaba’s Struggle for E-Commerce Legitimacy Is 
Undermined by Fake Gucci and Refugee Boats, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2017, 11:48 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/08/14/alibabas-struggle-for-e-commerce-
legitimacy-is-undermined-by-fake-gucci-and-refugee-boats/ [https://perma.cc/UTW7-9P64]. 
 209. Michael Zakkour, U.S. Agency Puts Alibaba’s Taobao Back on ‘Notorious Markets’ 
List—Here’s Why They’re Wrong, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2016, 2:22 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelzakkour/2016/12/22/u-s-agency-puts-alibaba-back-on-
notorious-markets-list-heres-why-theyre-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/CLR3-7283]. 
 210. Yiling Pan, Alibaba’s Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts Appear to Pay Off, JING DAILY (May 
21, 2018), https://jingdaily.com/alibaba-anti-counterfeiting/ [https://perma.cc/38BK-YZT3]. 
 211. Lucy T. Copp, Alibaba Now Flushes Out Fake Products in Under 24 Hours, 
COSMETICS BUS. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.cosmeticsbusiness.com/news/article_page/ 
Alibaba_now_flushes_out_fake_products_in_under_24_hours/132659 [https://perma.cc/ 
V86E-RJ5G]. 
 212. Pan, supra note 210. 
 213. See Copp, supra note 211. 
2019] MAKEUP OR FAKEUP? 331 
ineffective enforcement methods, consumers, companies, and e-commerce 
platforms are responsible for preventing the proliferation of counterfeits. 
III.  THE CURRENT IP REGIME IS ON THE CUSP OF A MAJOR CHANGE 
The major changes in the Chinese IP regime have sparked two distinct 
views about the regime’s future.  This Part discusses the two views regarding 
IP enforcement in light of counterfeit cosmetics trends.  In Part III.A, 
proponents already see signs of increasingly strong IP protection and 
enforcement, and the 2017–2018 developments may further bolster the 
regime.  In Part III.B, opponents argue that the national government is not 
developing policies that properly address the counterfeiting issue, which 
leaves international consumers largely still at risk. 
A.  Recent IP Developments Can Stop Counterfeit Cosmetics Production 
With China rapidly changing its IP laws and enforcement methods, 
proponents have expressed that these new implementations will be enough 
to correct the counterfeiting problem.  Chinese government officials, 
including President Xi Jinping, have expressed their desire to strengthen IP 
enforcement.214  This leaves some hopeful that China may soon become a 
leader in IP.215  Current trends among Chinese citizens, its courts, and foreign 
luxury companies indicate the development of a strong IP regime. 
China has already started responding to major criticisms, including 
challenges in obtaining evidence, awarding inadequate damages, and 
countering local protectionism.216  Inadequate damages were a major 
hindrance to litigation as a viable enforcement method,217 but the courts are 
moving towards steeper penalties.  For example, in 2017, New Balance 
received the largest damages thus far awarded, RMB 10 million (or about 
$1.5 million) for a trademark infringement.218  New Balance’s award reflects 
the general trend of increased damages awards in IP litigation.219  This 
general trend is supported by the 2019 Trademark Law amendment that 
increased statutory and punitive damages.220 
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Additionally, the new tribunals and discovery process prevent local judges 
from protecting local interests.221  The discovery process produces stronger 
evidence against counterfeiters, and the new tribunals are less inclined to 
show bias against foreign companies.222  Along with these improvements, 
some scholars interpret a rise in litigation223 to signify that IP rights will soon 
be strongly enforced.224  The rise in litigation shows a change in the attitudes 
of both the courts and rights holders.225 
The growing anticounterfeiting sentiment226 among Chinese individuals 
also indicates that the nation’s IP regime is improving.  Individuals, 
particularly the growing middle class who reside in smaller cities, prefer 
authentic luxury products over counterfeits.227  These individuals believe that 
counterfeits devalue the authentic brands.228  More Chinese citizens are 
valuing authentic brands and therefore valuing IP rights.  Historically, 
Chinese citizens did not bother to enforce their IP rights because they did not 
expect the government to facilitate the enforcement.229  Therefore, citizens’ 
acknowledgement of rights shows an improvement in enforcement 
efficiency. 
Further, foreign luxury companies are focusing their marketing campaigns 
on the growing middle class,230 which indicates that foreign companies trust 
Chinese citizens to respect IP laws and trust China to enforce IP rights against 
those who do not respect the laws.  A former SIPO commissioner, Tian Lipu, 
expressed that foreign companies’ involvement in China is a sign of their 
trust in the nation’s IP system231 and its citizens.  Major foreign companies 
like Apple would not choose China as a manufacturing site if they were afraid 
of infringement.232  Historically, foreign companies like Gucci avoided 
Chinese e-commerce platforms because of the counterfeiting issue.233  
Instead, companies would sell products in China through their own 
websites,234 which they would not do if they were afraid of counterfeiting, as 
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Tian noted.  Moreover, the new e-commerce law aimed at decreasing 
counterfeits on sites like Taobao and JD.com may the quell lingering fears of 
foreign companies. 
The implemented policies are already improving China’s IP system.  The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 2018 International IP Index shows China’s 
promise.235  This index uses forty indicators to analyze the IP regimes of fifty 
global economies.236  In the patents category, China’s score increased from 
4.35 (out of eight) in 2017 to a score of 5.50 in 2018.237  In comparison, the 
United States scored a 7.25 (behind eleven other countries).238  China’s 
increased score highlights the nation’s commitment to improving its IP 
regime by fostering innovation and building stronger enforcement 
methods.239  Given that the index did not account for the new e-commerce 
law and CNIPA, China’s index score may increase again in the next few 
years. 
Recent developments will continue to improve existing policies.  Critics 
of China’s IP regime often cite its fragmented agencies as a reason for 
inefficient enforcement.240  But CNIPA can correct IP fragmentation in the 
nation.241  Previously, SAIC conducted raids for trademark and copyright 
infringements, while SIPO conducted raids for patent infringements.242  
Under the old regime, rights holders had to choose a specific agency to 
enforce their IP rights.  Because CNIPA now oversees patents and 
trademarks, the pursuit of IP infringers will be much easier.  Previously, each 
agency had the authority to pursue only certain enforcement methods.243  
There would be inconsistent rulings if the products infringed on multiple 
rights.244  Under CNIPA, rights holders can request help through just one 
administration and this avoids the previous clash of authorities.245 
China’s new e-commerce law will decrease the number of counterfeits on 
the market.  For instance, Alibaba’s independently implemented takedown 
program drastically reduced counterfeits.246  The platform claimed that 97 
percent of reported counterfeits were removed before a single sale 
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occurred.247  As the e-commerce law has just become effective in 2019, other 
e-commerce platforms may also see drastic improvements in combating 
counterfeits. 
Proponents are hopeful that the government’s priority of improving its IP 
protection regime, along with the current IP landscape in China, will 
significantly decrease counterfeit sale and production. 
B.  Recent IP Developments Do Not Address the Underlying Issues of 
Counterfeit Cosmetics Prevention 
Opponents, however, argue that the new policies implemented in the past 
few years are not enough to limit counterfeiting,248 particularly in the 
cosmetics industry.  Chinese IP enforcement methods are insufficient to 
solve the counterfeiting problem because these efforts are mainly focused on 
catching counterfeits as they are about to enter or have already entered the 
market.249  Enforcing IP rights on the tail end of the process does not deter 
counterfeiters,250 and the new CNIPA structure still allows local officials to 
protect them. 
Despite recent developments, the demand for counterfeit cosmetics has 
risen.251  As a result, counterfeit cosmetics are reaching international markets 
through e-commerce.252  One report by a leading copyright protection 
company indicated that about 20 percent of online shoppers are unknowingly 
buying counterfeit cosmetics.253  Online brand infringement affects the 
cosmetics industry more than other industries.254  China’s counterfeiting 
continues to affect global e-commerce.  For example, in the United States, 
twenty-two Chinese defendants were charged with smuggling millions of 
dollars in counterfeit luxury goods, including cosmetics, from China.255  
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Evidently, counterfeiting in China is still prevalent256 despite China’s efforts 
to strengthen its IP enforcement. 
Further, despite the rising support for luxury products, consumers still 
support counterfeits.  The same middle-class citizens who value luxury 
products still purchase high-end counterfeits.257  Demand for high-end 
counterfeits has also rapidly increased alongside the demand for authentic 
luxury goods in China.258  The Chinese citizens who claim that counterfeits 
devalue brands still purchase these high-end counterfeits and have positive 
attitudes about their purchases.259  Further, these middle-class citizens are 
not the ones producing the counterfeit products.260  Middle-class Chinese 
citizens do not understand the full extent of the harm that counterfeits cause 
and they are not deterred from purchasing counterfeit goods.  Thus, even if 
there is an improving attitude about luxury brands, Chinese citizens do not 
fully believe the harm caused by counterfeits and will continue to support 
their production. 
Counterfeiters are also shifting to social media platforms to avoid China’s 
new e-commerce law.  Popular social media platforms like WeChat are 
considered nontraditional e-commerce platforms under the new law.261  Yet, 
a new trend among Chinese vloggers on social media is their ability to create 
counterfeit cosmetics that viewers are subsequently able to purchase.262  The 
new law may initially prevent vloggers from contributing to the counterfeit 
market;263 there is no guarantee that the law can shut down the market 
altogether.  Even though the law targets social media platforms, it only 
affects Chinese platforms, like WeChat.264  So, to avoid liability under this 
new law, counterfeit manufacturers and distributors may switch their focus 
to other e-commerce and social media platforms.  When counterfeiters realize 
that one market has been closed off to them, they may simply seek out a 
different market.  In other words, counterfeiters focus their marketing on 
platforms that do not conduct background checks on vendors and 
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merchandise265 and even use bots to drastically improve exposure and 
sales.266 
In fact, counterfeiters are already using markets where liability is minimal.  
Facebook and eBay account for more than 40 percent and 30 percent of 
online counterfeit cosmetics sales, respectively.267  Chinese e-commerce 
platforms collectively account for less than 15 percent of sales.268  
Alternatively, if counterfeiters realize that one company heavily pursues 
infringers, they can produce counterfeits of another company’s products.  
Given these strategies, simply passing an e-commerce law to hold some 
platforms, but not all, responsible will not impact the counterfeit market on 
a global scale. 
The discrepancy between the e-commerce laws of China and other nations 
leaves global trade vulnerable to counterfeits.  Although the new law holds 
Chinese e-commerce platforms liable for counterfeits, that liability does not 
extend to the United States.269  In the United States, e-commerce platforms 
like eBay are only liable if they know or have reason to know that the 
products on their platform are counterfeit and fail to take steps to remove 
them.270  These platforms do not have to prevent counterfeits from being 
posted on their sites.271 
This discrepancy, combined with counterfeiters’ shift towards using eBay, 
Amazon, and international social media platforms, allows counterfeiters to 
bypass the measures that China has put in place.272  Even if China is able to 
minimize counterfeiting within its nation, its laws are not able to prevent the 
products from reaching international markets. 
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Moreover, a centralized office overseeing patent and trademark 
infringements does not address the issue of local protectionism.  Even though 
CNIPA streamlines the process of enforcement, the Beijing-based agency 
may still need local affiliates to conduct its raids.  China’s size and diversity 
make it difficult for the agency to single-handedly enforce IP rights.273  A 
stronger centralized office does not combat local protectionism because local 
powers continue to determine the outcomes of raids.274  So long as these local 
officials choose to protect local interests over the interests of rights holders, 
there cannot be effective raids.  If local officials choose not to report IP 
infringement, that may hinder enforcement efforts altogether because 
enforcement raids are often the first step in civil litigation and criminal 
prosecution.275 
Further, the penalties handed down by CNIPA and the tribunal courts will 
not deter counterfeiters.  The increased damages awarded by tribunals and 
fines from raids are punishments rather than preventative measures against 
counterfeiters.  At best, these punishments may prevent the counterfeiters 
from recommitting the offense.276  But severe punishments alone are 
ineffective at maintaining low counterfeiting rates.277  China’s sole focus on 
strong punishments, while neglecting preventative methods, will not properly 
correct the counterfeiting issue.278  Instead, preventative measures like civic 
education may be more effective in lowering counterfeiting rates.279 
Because these counterfeits do not originate from within their nation, 
foreign governments cannot do much more beyond raids, confiscations, and 
litigation.  These are merely remedial—not preventative—measures.  Other 
nations continue to express concern about China’s counterfeiting issues.280  
Opponents of the counterfeiting industry recognize that the problems will not 
be resolved easily and believe that attempts to pass laws that convict 
consumers who purchase counterfeit goods “have fallen by the wayside.”281 
In brief, current methods place the responsibility to combat counterfeiting 
on companies, rights holders, e-commerce platforms, and local 
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governments.282  But the Chinese national government must be the one to fix 
the issue. 
IV.  CHINA MUST ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING ISSUES WITH ENFORCEMENT 
Some are hopeful that China’s increased efforts to enforce IP rights will 
fix the problem of counterfeiting,283 but companies and other nations remain 
skeptical.284  Opponents even predict an increase in the production 
counterfeit products in China.285  This Note argues that the current 
enforcement methods are not enough to stop counterfeiting.  The new 
developments do not address the root of the problem, which is that the 
production of counterfeits is focused in rural areas where there is strong 
support for the practice.286 
This Note suggests that the government should focus on improving 
perceptions of IP law amongst Chinese citizens, particularly the local 
officials and citizens in rural areas where counterfeit production occurs.  In a 
nation where societal values take priority over individual rights, counterfeits 
are viewed as a benefit to China, especially to local economies.287  So long 
as citizens and local officials hold onto this perception, current enforcement 
methods are not enough to deter counterfeit production.  Companies and 
foreign governments have taken measures to prevent counterfeits from 
reaching their own markets, but they have no incentive to prevent 
counterfeits on a large scale.288  For these reasons, the Chinese national 
government is the only entity that can holistically address counterfeiting. 
Part IV.A argues that China’s history and culture has led to the common 
belief that IP laws are not important.  Part IV.B suggests that the national 
government can change this perception through education campaigns and 
make enforcement of IP rights more effective.  The 2008 Olympics, hosted 
in Beijing, is one instance where the government’s efforts to change 
perceptions about IP rights was successful.  This Part suggests using the 
methods used by the Chinese government during the 2008 Olympics to 
correct issues with counterfeit cosmetics, while also noting how the 
differences between the two scenarios will cause challenges.  Part IV.C 
recommends further enforcement methods to supplement education 
campaigns. 
A.  Cultural Values Prevent Effective Enforcement 
The Chinese government needs to focus on preventing the production of 
counterfeits by positively improving perceptions of IP rights.  Positive 
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reinforcement will supplement enforcement like fines and criminal 
punishments. 
China’s culture of shan zhai, Confucian principles, and history of 
appeasing Western nations289 have led citizens to believe that IP laws do not 
matter.  Chinese culture stresses societal over individual interests and 
oscillating government stances regarding IP have reinforced the idea that IP 
is a community right.290  Historically, China adopted modern IP laws that 
aligned with Western philosophy.291  For decades, China enacted policies 
that focused on bringing its IP regime in line with international standards to 
open itself to trade with Western nations.292 
Counterfeiting persists because China’s cultural and social norms clash 
with these Western-based laws.293  As a result, IP laws are largely ignored 
by counterfeiters and consumers of counterfeits.294  To reconcile the clashing 
philosophies, the government must positively improve Chinese perceptions 
about IP protections by changing the current notions that such laws only 
protect foreign brands and that counterfeits help China. 
B.  The Government Must Change Perceptions of IP Rights, Particularly 
Among Rural Citizens 
Improving attitudes about IP rights, particularly in rural regions, is a start 
to improving enforcement effectiveness.  There is increasing support for 
foreign luxury brands, particularly from the rising middle class.295  However, 
the Chinese middle class resides mostly in small cities,296 whereas 
counterfeiting is common in rural areas.297  As such, the government needs 
to focus its efforts on changing perceptions about IP law within these rural 
areas.  Local officials in these areas favor counterfeiters because of the 
benefits that they provide to the local economy.298  To these officials, the 
local interests are more important than the interests of the individual rights 
holders—usually a foreign company.299  These views lead officials to believe 
that underenforcing rights is acceptable.300  Instead, the government must 
promote the understanding that counterfeits hurt societal interests, even local 
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ones, and that protecting IP rights help the nation.  Doing so would encourage 
local officials to confiscate counterfeit products and penalize infringers.301 
Government practices during the 2008 Olympics in Beijing can serve as a 
guide for improving such attitudes.  China’s IP enforcement efforts to protect 
the trademarks associated with the Olympics were highly publicized, which 
helped educate Chinese citizens about the importance of IP rights.302  As a 
result, fake Olympic merchandise was uncommon in China and almost 
nonexistent in Beijing.303  China reformed citizens’ attitudes towards IP 
rights using education campaigns, media assistance, and celebrity 
endorsements.304  Education campaigns informed citizens about the value 
that IP enforcement brings to the Chinese economy.305 
The education campaign reached Chinese citizens at a local level.  Local 
business owners were encouraged to pledge to refrain from producing 
Olympics-themed counterfeits.306  The Chinese government also recruited 
volunteers to collect evidence against infringers.307  The government framed 
participation in the pledge and collection of evidence as fulfilling one’s social 
responsibility to ensure that the Olympics adequately represented China’s 
success.308  This framework led citizens to believe that Olympics-themed 
counterfeits were “an offense against the glory of the Chinese people.”309 
While this government practice during the Olympics can serve as a model, 
there are three major distinctions between the Olympics and counterfeit 
cosmetics that the government must overcome.  First, the government used 
the national excitement of the games to inform citizens of their social 
responsibility to honor the Olympics trademarks.310  This was the first time 
China was hosting the Olympics, and many of the citizens were excited about 
the opportunity.311  Unlike the Olympics, there is no national excitement over 
fixing counterfeit cosmetics.  The government utilized the excitement of the 
Olympics to swiftly enforce the importance of IP rights because the nation 
was working on a specific timeline.312 
Here, education campaigns can still be successful in curtailing counterfeit 
cosmetics, albeit at a slower pace than during the Olympics.  There is no 
truncated timeline for combatting counterfeit cosmetics.  But even if there is 
no national excitement, Chinese citizens have been increasingly interested in 
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luxury cosmetics,313 and the government can utilize this interest to educate 
them about the harms of counterfeits.  As with the Olympics, using celebrity 
endorsements and media outlets can attract the attention of the rising middle 
class, who appreciate luxury.314  These methods could teach them about the 
harms of counterfeit cosmetics and dissuade this population from purchasing 
even high-end counterfeits.315 
Another distinction is that the Olympics are episodic occurrences, whereas 
combatting counterfeit cosmetics is an ongoing process.  With episodic 
events, people may be more willing to restrict their activities for the sake of 
China’s success.  It may be difficult to maintain ongoing support for 
authentic, foreign companies.316  Instead, China must focus on long-term 
education campaigns, primarily teaching younger citizens about the 
importance of IP rights.317  Unlike the brief enforcement period during the 
2008 Olympics, enforcement against counterfeit cosmetics must be long-
term. 
Chinese citizens viewed the Olympics as a reflection of their nation’s 
success—and they believed that infringement of Olympics trademarks 
reflected poorly on their nation.318  Infringers usually produce counterfeits of 
foreign goods that they believe reflect foreign success.319  Proponents of shan 
zhai support counterfeiting because it takes success away from foreign 
companies and brings success to China.320  While this distinction is a big 
hurdle to overcome, the success of protecting the Olympics trademarks 
shows that citizens are willing to respect foreign organizations that help the 
nation’s economy.321  There is growing support for foreign luxury 
companies,322 but the government needs to improve support for foreign 
companies among rural citizens.  The education campaigns could focus on 
teaching rural citizens that foreign organizations can help their economy, like 
the Olympics did. 
Finally, with China playing host to the 2022 Winter Olympics, the national 
government can improve on its IP enforcement efforts seen during the 2008 
Olympics.  China can use these efforts as a guide to correct its ongoing issues 
with counterfeit cosmetics.  In preparation for the 2022 Olympics, China 
amended its Regulation on the Protection of Olympic Symbols to account for 
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changes since the 2008 Olympics.323  Among other revisions, the regulation 
increased punishments for IP infringement, defined the protection period for 
the Olympic symbols, and simplified the process for rights holders to validate 
their symbols.324  These revisions clear up ambiguities in the 2008 
regulation; for example, the new regulation defined the protection period as 
ten years and stipulates a rights renewal process.325  These amendments were 
adopted to better protect the 2022 Olympics IP in comparison with the 2008 
Olympics—and China can use these improved enforcement efforts as a 
resource to guide efforts to tackle counterfeit cosmetics. 
Changing citizens’ attitudes about IP rights is a serious endeavor.  But if 
China wants to effectively tackle the counterfeiting problem, education 
campaigns would be a strong start. 
C.  Changing Perceptions Will Improve Penalties and Fines 
Promoting anticounterfeiting sentiments will improve current and future 
enforcement methods.  The government can also adopt stronger enforcement 
methods to combat counterfeiters and discipline local officials.  The 
government should provide strict mandates to local administrators.326  
Holding officials accountable when they fail to report trademark 
infringement in favor of local interests will improve the success of raids327 
and possibly lead to increased litigation and prosecution.  The fragmented 
nature of China’s IP system328 makes it difficult for the national government 
to ensure that local officials are conducting proper investigations.  The 
central government cannot carry out raids without local assistance329—and it 
cannot oversee each local official’s raids.  Due to fragmentation, even if the 
national government currently held local officials liable for improper raids 
de jure, the national government could not enforce this liability de facto.330 
However, if overall sentiments were improved, officials would feel 
pressure from their constituents to properly conduct raids.331  Like with the 
Olympics, the local business owners who helped gather evidence against 
counterfeiters could also supply evidence of local corruption as well.332  
When rural citizens no longer see counterfeiting as a benefit to Chinese 
society, local officials will face a real risk of punishment for corruption.  
Similarly, if their constituents no longer feel that counterfeiting helps their 
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local economy, the officials will lose a major incentive to underenforce IP 
rights, as their corruption will no longer be in line with societal interests.333 
Changing public perception will also improve current enforcement 
methods without the need to amend current statutes.  China’s Olympics 
trademark law was virtually identical to the existing national trademark 
law.334  The language of the Olympics law provided the same enforcement 
techniques.335  Yet enforcement rates were drastically different.  With the 
Olympics, fixed penalties deterred potential counterfeiters.336  Instead of 
penalties calculated based on the price of the counterfeits, officials calculated 
the penalties using the price on the authentic version.  Basing penalties on 
price of the authentic version resulted in higher penalties every time.337  Even 
with the difference in penalties, however, enforcement depended on local 
officials and judges.  Without improving the attitudes about IP laws, local 
authorities will not properly enforce penalties, even if the Chinese 
government mandates higher penalties. 
In sum, China must overcome centuries of anti-IP sentiment.  Culturally, 
citizens prioritize their own local interests over the interests of foreign 
companies, which enables the production of counterfeits.  To correct this 
issue, China must change its citizens’ perceptions about the importance of IP 
regulation.  The government successfully reduced counterfeits during the 
Olympics and can use those methods to help develop a long-term solution to 
stop counterfeit cosmetics.  Only then will enforcement methods be effective. 
CONCLUSION 
The cosmetics industry is growing, making it a prime target for Chinese 
counterfeits.  As a burgeoning economic power, China has sought to tackle 
its counterfeiting problem and demonstrate to the world that it is serious 
about IP laws.  China has been increasing its efforts in IP enforcement, which 
has led some to believe that it will soon have a strong IP regime.  However, 
research indicates that counterfeit cosmetics remain popular—even among 
Chinese citizens—and demand for these counterfeits has led to increased 
supply.  Current enforcement methods place much of the responsibility on 
consumers, businesses, and local governments and only address the 
counterfeits once they have been produced.  Instead, the Chinese government 
must assume the bulk of the responsibility by introducing preventative 
measures supplemented by penalties and punishments.  China’s success at 
stamping out counterfeit goods during the 2008 Olympics and subsequent 
efforts for the 2022 Olympics can help to illuminate a path forward. 
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